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Mobilizing Resources
In the traditional paradigm of a foodborne
disease outbreak, the cases were from a small
local group, and the attack rate was high. Local
health officials generally detected and investi-
gated the outbreak. In the emerging paradigm, a
diffuse outbreak may be spread over a very wide
area, perhaps several counties or states, even
with a low infective dose and a low attack rate.
The outbreak may be registered only as an
increase in sporadic cases and detected only
because of specific laboratory-based subtyping
surveillance. Whether Salmonella serotyping or
another molecular method identifies a cluster of
related cases, the investigations are more complex,
and often no obvious food-handling error is found.
Industry contamination may be involved, and
implications may be industrywide or nationwide.
Detecting a widespread outbreak requires
increased reliance on laboratory subtyping by
state public health laboratories at a time when
some states are considering eliminating or
privatizing their laboratories. Surveillance data
must be rapidly compared over increasingly
broad regions, not just at the county level but at
the state, regional, and national levels. Increased
awareness is needed throughout the system that
a local outbreak may herald a broader problem.
Moreover, investigations must be conducted
quickly to prevent future cases. Because of the
low levels of microbiologic contamination, the
right specimens and samples of food must be
used. Available epidemiologic data should guide
this selection so that the most likely vehicles are
sampled. Traceback must extend beyond the
immediate preparation of the implicated food to
the whole chain of preparation, i.e., sources of
ingredients, processing, storage, and transporta-
tion; cooperation at all levels of industry is
required. The goals are to control the ongoing
outbreak, remove the contaminated product from
the market, and learn how to prevent similar
outbreaks. Intervention in outbreaks must
change. Emergency intervention must be based
on solid epidemiologic data (appropriate study
design and sample size and clear statistical
association with logical and biologic plausibility)
and cannot always wait for laboratory confirma-
tion of a contaminated product. Illnesses will not
wait for laboratory examination to yield the
pathogen; the pathogen may not be detectable
with current technologies, the food may not be
available, and the delay can be critical.
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The foodborne outbreak paradigm has shifted. In the past, an outbreak affected a
small local population, had a high attack rate, and involved locally prepared food
products with limited distribution. Now outbreaks involve larger populations and may be
multistate and even international; in many the pathogenic organism has a low infective
dose and sometimes is never isolated from the food product. Delay in identifying the
causative agent can allow the outbreak to spread, increasing the number of cases.
Emergency intervention should be aimed at controlling the outbreak, stopping exposure,
and perhaps more importantly, preventing future outbreaks. Using epidemiologic data
and investigative techniques may be the answer. Even with clear statistical associations
to a contaminated food, one must ensure that the implicated organism could logically
and biologically have been responsible for the outbreak.
1The author has summarized the transcripts of panel discus-
sions by Dennis Lang, Craig Hedberg, Eric Johnson,  Suzanne
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The Human Side of Foodborne Disease
Public health officials in Washington state
screened children with bloody diarrhea and
hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) as the result
of a large outbreak of Escherichia coli O157:H7
infection in 1993. One isolate of the organism
caused perhaps 75% of the cases, not 100%. As a
result, the source of the infection was identified,
and regulatory action was taken to halt future
cases. Hospitals reported fewer new cases after
this action. However, 500 Washington state
residents, two-thirds of them children under 15
years of age, became infected before the
incriminating food could be removed from the
market. The HUS attack rate was approximately
12% for children under the age of 16 years. The
organism was recovered from the food product
(hamburger), and DNA fingerprinting was
initiated by several techniques. The number of
colony-forming units of E. coli O157:H7 in the
hamburger was relatively low.
This organism can cause severe life-
threatening infection, even with an inoculum
rate too low to be detected by testing. In the
United States, the incidence of HUS is
approximately 1.7 cases per 100,000 children
under the age of 15 years. This figure is based on
data from King County, Washington, in the early
1980s and indicates that there are 1,000 cases of
HUS in the United States per year or an average
of 2.8 cases per day in a population of 250 million.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
has recently reported that only half of the country’s
microbiologists screen for this organism.
Clostridium botulinum, A Reemerging
Pathogen
The outstanding property of C. botulinum is
its ability to synthesize a neurotoxin of
extraordinary potency (lethal dose is approxi-
mately one microgram). C. botulinum is an
unusual foodborne pathogen in that it causes
neuroparalytic rather than diarrheal disease.
During illness, the first nerves affected are the
cranial nerves in the head and eye; the paralysis
can descend and affect every peripheral nerve in
the body. The toxin can enter into foods, but in
recent years, C. botulinum has also been found to
colonize the intestinal tract of infants under 1
year of age and of adults that have undergone
intestinal surgery or have been treated with
antibiotics. The number of cases of adults with
unusual clostridia that produce botulinum
toxin is increasing.
Botulism occurs worldwide. The highest
incidence is found in Poland and in Asia and is
related to food handling (in Poland, home
canned meats).
New food processes and packaging have been
associated with the reemergence of botulism. A
clam chowder outbreak in California involved a
boxed food that was not properly stored.
Because boxed foods generally do not require
refrigeration, the food was kept at ambient
temperature; however, it was not shelf stable
and should have been refrigerated.
A large outbreak (30 cases) of botulism
occurred in a restaurant in El Paso when potatoes
were cooked in foil, left wrapped, and then used in
potato salad. Baking had eliminated vegetative
organisms, but the spores of botulinum were not
killed. In this case, a low-acid food was held under
anaerobic conditions.
Botulism outbreaks are probably the most
reported type of foodborne illness. Changes in
processing and ingredients in foods and formula-
tions can inadvertently lead to the growth of C.
botulinum.  Failure to thoroughly heat a food
product may allow the botulinum toxin to survive.
DNA Fingerprinting
Responding to the threat of emerging
foodborne diseases requires public health
surveillance that is based on epidemiologic
methods and close collaboration between epide-
miologists and public health laboratories.
Surveillance for foodborne diseases should include
pathogen-specific surveillance to identify clusters
of cases caused by the same organism and
epidemiologic investigations to identify the source.
The Minnesota State Department of Health
is developing a new approach to foodborne
disease surveillance. A Salmonella Enteritidis
(SE) outbreak was first recognized by the public
health laboratory when the number of SE isolates
suddenly increased. Because many of the isolates
came from clinical laboratories in southeastern
Minnesota, the outbreak initially seemed re-
gional. However, within 48 hours of initiating a
case-control study, a nationally distributed food
product was identified as the vehicle, and the
nationwide scope of the outbreak was docu-
mented. This was an example of consequential
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consumption and SE was announced, the
evidence implicating a particular brand was
limited to a single case-control study of 15
matched pairs. Laboratory isolation of SE from
official samples was not reported until 10 days
later. This prompt action, based on epidemiologic
data, prevented at least 10 days of potential
exposure for thousands of consumers. Consequen-
tial epidemiology produces results that translate
into disease prevention. We need to continue to
develop models for how to rapidly evaluate and act
on epidemiologic data and how to better coordinate
activities regionally and nationally.
A critical element of the success of this type of
foodborne disease surveillance is the specificity
with which we can match isolates that may be
epidemiologically linked. Molecular subtyping
schemes such as pulsed-field gel electrophore-
sis can greatly improve identification of
clusters of the same organisms such as
particular  Salmonella serotypes.
Another example involved analysis of a
typical epidemiologic curve for a seemingly single
outbreak. When isolates were analyzed, however,
a cluster of small outbreaks was found. One was
caused by infected food handlers at a restaurant.
This outbreak would have continued, and the
infected food handlers would have provided an
ongoing source of infection to patrons had the
cluster not been identified through subtype-
specific surveillance. This incident serves as a
model for how foodborne disease surveillance
systems must be developed and used. Molecular
subtyping has revolutionized our ability to
conduct meaningful surveillance. We consider it
an integral part of disease prevention and control
and continue to explore its usefulness.
Parasites
Cyclospora cayetanensis is a protozoan
coccidian parasite. A one-celled organism, it is
related to other organisms such as Toxoplasma
and  Cryptosporidium. It is a prototypical
emerging pathogen. C. cayetanensis is unusual in
that it is not immediately infectious when
excreted. Under optimal conditions, it matures in
days to weeks, so direct person-to-person spread
is very unlikely. An outbreak following a meal is
probably not caused by the food handler. The
organism appears to be seasonal, and in most
places where it has been studied, it occurs in the
spring or summer and causes little or no disease
during the fall or winter. Infection has been
reported throughout the world, and the key
studies have been conducted in Peru and Nepal.
Disease caused by C. cayetanensis is character-
ized by watery stools, nausea, weight loss, low-
grade fever, fatigue, or any combination of these
symptoms. The disease (which is easily
treatable) can be quite protracted, and without
treatment, relapse can occur. The mean
incubation period of 1 week complicates the
epidemiology; cases may not be recognized
until 2 weeks after people have been exposed.
In 1996, more than 1,450 cases of Cyclospora
were reported in the United States (87%) and
Canada (13%). Approximately half of them were
in clusters; the other half were sporadic (not
epidemiologically linked to other cases). More
than 65% of the 1,450 cases were laboratory
confirmed; 22 infected patients were hospital-
ized. Fifty-five clusters were reported, 47 in the
United States and 8 in Canada. An average of 28
attendees per event and a very high attack rate
were reported. The attack rate was 56% for
attendees, not for people who ate the implicated
food. At least one type of fresh berry was served at
every event and, despite other types of exposures,
no other food was implicated in any cluster
investigation. The berry did not always achieve
statistical significance, largely because of the
small number of attendees at a specific event. The
berry most likely linked to the cases was later
determined. That type of berry was served at 50%
to 91% of the 55 events; it was the only kind
served at 10 or 11 of the events.
We had overwhelming epidemiologic evidence,
but we never identified Cyclospora on any
raspberries. Two factors, at least, contributed to
this. The test for C. cayetanensis did not exist when
this outbreak occurred; therefore, no implicated
raspberries were tested. The question in this
investigation as in others is how much epidemio-
logic evidence is needed to implicate a food as the
vehicle of disease? A review team may be needed to
look at the epidemiologic data and determine if they
are adequate to warrant informing the public about
a hazardous food. We are seeing new pathogens,
new species. As outbreaks cross into other states,
the need for coordination between health officials in
the states and in the federal government becomes
more urgent.
Conclusions
Early identification of the outbreak and the
organism can prevent future cases. Recent554 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997
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investigations have found that the presence of an
organism even at low levels can cause serious
consequences. Fingerprinting organisms for
identification during outbreaks is extremely
important. In some instances, fingerprinting has
helped identify several small outbreaks that
initially appeared to be one large outbreak. We
can no longer afford to wait for all the evidence
and laboratory results to be collected and
reported; we must use epidemiologic data. Once
the outbreak is identified, DNA fingerprinting is
needed to identify whether other outbreaks are
occurring simultaneously.
A rapid and coordinated response is needed
among state officials and federal agencies.
Interventions should stop outbreaks and identify
products causing illness so they can be removed
from the market. Then health officials need to
take the next step—investigate what happened
and determine the cause so that similar
outbreaks can be prevented.